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The Disciplinary Dilemma Confronting Attorneys
Seeking to Counsel Civil Disobedients
I. INTRODUCTION
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitu-
tions, upon laws, and upon courts. [T]hese are false hopes. Liberty lies in
the hearts of men and women.'
An attorney sympathetic to a client's moral conviction that a
law, validly passed,2 is inherently unjust, must be aware of the im-
pending disciplinary sanctions3 that may be faced should counsel-
ing be given to such a client who proceeds to engage in acts of civil
disobedience. The Code of Professional Responsibility proscribes
such counseling, providing that "[a] lawyer shall not ...counsel
or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal
"14
An act of civil disobedience necessarily involves a public, know-
ing violation of a valid law.' The lawyer, although not actually par-
ticipating in the disobedient act, may be subjected to disciplinary,
and possibly criminal, sanctions by encouraging and counseling
those who seek to engage in this form of behavior.6
This comment seeks to provide a definitional and analytical
1. L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189-90 (1960).
2. A validly passed law for the purposes of this discussion refers to a law promulgated
by a duly elected legislative body or public commission where valid delegation of authority
was made by a legislative body. Validity will denote conformity to due process considera-
tions and has no bearing on the "morality" of the law.
3. Sanctions range from disbarment, suspension, public censure and probation by the
supreme court to private reprimand and private informal admonition by state disciplinary
boards. See, e.g., PA.R.D.E. 204(A), PA. RULES OF COURT (West 1984).
4. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon 1984). The American Bar Association has submitted for consideration a new set of
professional guidelines, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Should these rules be
adopted, no substantial change would result in the ABA's proscription against a lawyer
counseling a civil disobedient prior to the commitment of the act. Proposed Rule 1.2(d)
provides that "a lawyer shall not counsel or assist a client in conduct the lawyer knows is
criminal." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.2(d) (Final Draft 1982).
5. Valid law and validly passed laws will be used interchangeably to denote the proce-
dural validity of the law in question. See supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Rostow, No Right to Civil Disobedience, TRIAL, June-July 1970 at 16, 17.
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backdrop against which to examine problems posed by counseling
clients planning civilly disobedient acts. It is also hoped that some
common misconceptions concerning the purposes and methods of
civil disobedience will be dispelled, since many commentators have
in the past incorrectly characterized civil disobedience as inher-
ently revolutionary, anarchistic, 7 or violent.' Finally, it will be sub-
mitted in this comment that either the disciplinary rules or their
interpretation are in need of modification in order to insulate the
attorney who, in good faith, "[sleeks to bring law and morality into
closer congruence even if this requires breaking a few laws."9
II. TOWARD A DEFINITION AND JUSTIFICATION OF CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE
A. The Philosophic Underpinnings
At the heart of civil disobedience is the belief by the actor that a
law of a state' 0 is morally unjust and thus morally unenforceable.
The civil disobedient has weighed the political obligation to obey
the law against the moral obligations imposed by his conscience. A
conscientious decision not to obey unjust laws follows the exhaus-
tion of all legal attempts to change the law." Among those who
have insisted that moral obligations are superior to legal obliga-
tions include such unlikely bedfellows as the late Bertrand Russell,
the American Conference of Catholic Bishops, Governor George
7. See, e.g., Powell, A Lawyer Who Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 205 (1966), where Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., before his appointment to the Supreme
Court, declared that "mass civil disobedience, no matter what the provocation ... is anar-
chy, which always results in chaos." Id. at 230.
8. See, e.g., Schlesinger, Civil Disobedience: The Problem of Selective Obedience to
Law, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 947, 955-57 (1976).
9. E. ZASHIN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY 126 (1972).
10. By "state" is meant a law of a particularly governing body, including federally
enacted laws, as opposed to the restrictive definition of state within the context of being an
autonomous subdivision.
11. As will be discussed further at note 45 and accompanying text, all legal methods to
effectuate desired change should be exhausted before engaging in civil disobedience.
Deborah Greenblatt, commenting on conscientious dissent has stated:
It is not merely an instance of doing as one pleases. It presumes that the general
obligation to obey is outweighed by a greater obligation to justice, righteousness, or
human life. The decision to disobey is made in full awareness of the possible conse-
quences; it is based on factual background; and it is seldom made without serious
misgivings and doubts . . . . [T]he idea of conscientiousness embodies rationality,
concern for others, a need for consistent conduct and recognition of both the ends to
be met and the intermediate consequences.
Greenblatt, Defense of the Civilly Disobedient, 13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 158, 161-62 (1982).
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Wallace and Eldridge Cleaver. 2 This diversely held view is com-
pelling given the events of this century: Professor Noam Chomsky
has argued convincingly that, after the lessons of Dauchau and Au-
schwitz, no person of conscience can believe that authority must
always be obeyed.
1 3
Justification for the proposition that moral duties override legal
or political obligations stems from the doctrine of natural rights.1
In essence, this theory presupposes that a "natural law" exists
based upon divine or eternal law, such as that stemming from the
Bible or other scripture."5 In American law, the Declaration of In-
12. R. HALL, THE MORALITY OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 55 (1971).
13. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1967, (Magazine), at 27. In 1967, the editors of the New York
Times Magazine asked thirteen scholars, including William F. Buckley, Jr., Noam Chomsky
and Sidney Hook, for their positions on civil disobedience. All but one of the scholars, John
Dollard, agreed that civil disobedience was justified in appropriate circumstances. Id.
14. Common bases for the justification of civil disobedience include religious beliefs
and utilitarian principles. For a discussion of utilitarian principles and civil disobedients,
see H. BEDEAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE-THEORY AND PRACTICE 236-39 (1969).
Many commentators cite as an early incident of civil disobedience arising from religious
belief the acts of the midwives in the Second Book of the Pentateuch who refused to follow
the command of Pharaoh to kill all male children born to Hebrews' Exodus 1:15-18; Green-
blatt, supra note 11. See also D. DAUBE, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN ANTIQUITY 5. Daube recounts
the incident of the Hebrew midwives and goes on to quote Exodus 1:17: "[Blut the midwives
feared God and did not as the King of Egypt commanded them, but saved the men children
alive." Id.
15. St. Thomas Aquinas considered in depth both law and man's obligation to obey it.
Questions 90 through 97 of the Summa Theologica discusses four kinds of law with an ex-
planation of their interrelationship. Aquinas defined "eternal law" as a type of Divine Wis-
dom, which directs all things to their end. Quest. 93, Art. 1. "Natural Law" is man's percep-
tion of, and participation in, the eternal law by use of his own reasoning power. Quest. 91,
Art. 2. "Human Law" is the body of law devised by human reason from the precepts of
natural law. Quest. 91, Art. 3. "Divine Law" or "Holy Scripture", according to Aquinas,
consisted of commandments given to man by God directly, so that such commandments
would not be subject to imperfections in man's perception of eternal law. Quest. 91, Art. 4.
Aquinas held that, in the case of a Human Law which violated Divine Law or Holy Scrip-
ture, "Laws of this kind must in no wise be observed." Quest. 96, Art. 4. Hence, it appears
that if an act of civil disobedience was directed towards laws which violated "scripture",
Aquinas would agree that one is under no obligation to obey them.
For a detailed discussion of Aquinas' writings concerning divine law as a basis for disobe-
dience, see Weber, Toward a Theory of Civil Disobedience, 13 CATH. LAW. 198, 202-10
(1967).
This Thomistic imperative is still evident in Catholic teaching. See, e.g., THE TEACHING OF
CHRIST: A CATHOLIC CATECHISM FOR ADULTS 349 (R. Lawler, D. Wherl & T. Lawler eds. 1976)
("If any government does not acknowledge human rights, or violates them, not only does it
fail in its duty, but its orders are wholly lacking in binding force.") (quoting Pope John
XXIII, Encyclical, Pacem in Terris, April 11, 1963).
However, a source of "higher law" need not always stem from belief in a divine being. In
numerous cases, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that one's own moral or-
der "can be sufficient to premise conscientious objection to the laws of the state. See, e.g.,
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1964) (exempting from the Selective Service Act
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dependence can be turned to as reflecting this Higher Law in a
secular context. 16
A second basic principle underlying the justification of civil diso-
bedience is that government exists by the consent of the governed;
hence, "political" law does not necessarily contain any moral or di-
vine force of its own. Laws may thus be promulgated which contra-
dict higher eternal laws which must govern the moral life. 17 A
striking example of man-made law conflicting with natural or
"Higher Law" was the attempted extermination of the Jewish pop-
ulation in Germany. Though this extermination was entirely "le-
gal," the Nazis' practices under cover of law would be considered
repugnant to, and violative of, the most basic ethical system. 8
B. The Elements of Civil Disobedience
Definitions of civil disobedience vary from commentator to com-
mentator.' 9 However, most would agree that the elements of civil
disobedience include: 1) a deliberate violation of a valid law, or, at
least, of a public norm generally considered binding; 2) committed
as a form of protest; 3) whereby the actor is willing to accept any
legal punishment; 4) which is non-revolutionary; 5) public; 6) non-
violent (entailing at a minimum non-resistance to arrest and re-
fusal to respond with violence to provocations from any source);
and 7) done with the intent primarily to educate or persuade the
majority.2
three conscientious objectors who did not belong to an established religious sect).
16. The second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence is the portion of the
document which most reflects natural law precepts:
We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. . . . [tihat whenever any Form of Govern-
ment becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abol-
ish it ....
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
17. See generally Greenblatt, supra note 11; KING, Letter from Birmingham City Jail,
in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 83 (1963).
18. See generally A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 18 (1968).
19. Compare Professor Rawl's definition, "A public, non-violent and conscientious yet
political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law
or policies of a government."; Rawls, The Justification of Civil Disobedience, in MORAL
PROBLEMS: A COLLECTION OF PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 126 at 132 (Rachels 1st ed. 1970), with
Keeton's definition, "An act of civil disobedience (is] ... an act of deliberate and open
violation of law with the intent, within the framework of the prevailing form of government,
to protest a wrong or to accomplish some betterment in the society." Keeton, The Morality
of Civil Disobedience, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 507, 508 (1964).
20. Adapted from ZASHIN, supra note 9, at 110.
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The purposes of an act of civil disobedience, as its elements indi-
cate, are twofold. The first is to enlighten the general populous
that a governmental authority is fostering some injustice. It is
hoped that when the injustice is elucidated, the governing author-
ity will reconsider its position and bring the law into closer har-
mony with the moral position espoused. Professor Harrop Freeman
has noted that the civil disobedient is "looking dramatically for
reconsideration" of the questioned law.21 Both the necessity and
legitimacy of this latter purpose are bolstered when recognizing
that the possibility of alternative or "dissenting" behavior may be
forever foreclosed by (in the United States) the Supreme Court
holding a morally objectionable law or practice constitutional.
Blithe acceptance of such a prospect would have worked to freeze
into permanency such cases as Dred Scott v. Sanford,22 Plessy v.
Ferguson,2 3 United States v. Macintosh,2 " and other decisions up-
holding equally opprobrious laws.
Necessary elements of a truly civilly disobedient act include a
non-violent, public violation of the objected-to law whereby the ac-
tor is willing to accept the legally prescribed punishment. 5 The
incorporation of these three elements assures both the sincerity of
the actor in his belief that the violated law is morally unjust and
that the dissenter is not acting exclusively out of self interest. By
accepting the punishment, the civil disobedient demonstrates that
he does not hold himself above the law since he willingly submits
himself to the legal system he seeks to reform.26
21. Freeman, Moral Preemption Part I: the Case for the Disobedient, 17 HASTINGS
L.J. 425 (1965-66). Professor Freeman has authored numerous other articles concerning lib-
erty and civil disobedience including: Freeman, Civil Disobedience and the Law, 21
RUTGERS L. REv. 17 (1966); Freeman, The Right of Protest and Civil Disobedience, 41 IND.
L.J. 228 (1966); Freeman, Civil Liberties-Acid Test of Democracy, 43 MINN. L. REV. 511
(1959); Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 806 (1958).
22. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (rights and privileges conferred by Constitution upon
citizens do not apply to the Negro race).
23. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (laws requiring separation of white and Negro races in public
accomodations are a reasonable exercise of state's police power).
24. 283 U.S. 605 (1931) (citizenship denied petitioner who refused to take the Oath of
Allegiance upon acknowledging that he would bear arms to defend the country only if he
believed it to be in the interests of humanity in the long run).
25. Professor Keeton discusses in detail the necessity of a deliberate, open act before
the breaching of a law can be termed "civil disobedience." See Keeton, supra note 19. Kee-
ton also discusses the purposes underlying the necessity of the act being open to plain view.
Id.
26. Rawls, supra note 19, discusses the non-violent nature of civil disobedience and
concluded:
The non-violent nature of civil disobedience refers to the fact that it is intended to
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That the defiance is open, public and non-violent demonstrates
that there is no intent to subvert. Civil disobedients are thus not
covert plotters seeking the demise of the existing legal system or
political order. Their defiance is, in fact, often made known to the
authorities in advance to avoid disorder. One commentator has ex-
plained further that "[riebellion seeks overthrow of constituted au-
thority, or at least repudiates that authority in some sphere; civil
disobedience does neither. '2 7 Civil disobedience, on the contrary, is
undertaken as a moral imperative and is aimed at a specific law or
set of laws after exhaustion of proper legal channels. As such, civil
disobedience is clearly distinguishable from rebellion or revolution
since the purpose of civil disobedience is the modification of the
current legal system, rather than upheaval of the entire legal and
political order.2" For purposes of this discussion2 9 the definition of
civil disobedience as formulated by Professor Rawls will thus suf-
fice: "[civil disobedience is a] public, non-violent, conscientious yet
political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing
about a change in the law or policies of a government." 30
address the sense of justice of the majority and as such it is a form of speech, an
expression of conviction. To engage in violent acts likely to injure and to hurt is in-
compatible with civil disobedience as a mode of address. Indeed, an interference with
the basic rights of others tends to obscure the civilly disobedient quality of one's act.
Civil disobedience is non-violent in the further sense that the legal penalty for one's
action is accepted and that resistance is not (at least for the moment) contemplated.
Rawls, supra note 19, at 133.
For an extensive discussion of non-violent protest as an avenue to effectuate desired
changes in law and policy, see Woffort, Non-Violence and the Law: The Law Needs Help,
15 J. RELIG. THOUGHT 25 (1957-58).
27. Cohen, Essence and Ethics of Civil Disobedience, 198 NATION 260 (1964).
28. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
29. The scope of this comment does not permit a full scale excursion into the subtle-
ties of civil disobedience. Such subtleties include the categorical distinctions between civil
disobedience which is direct (an act which violates a law perceived to be unjust) and indi-
rect (for example, sit-ins against racially discriminating proprietors wherein the law vio-
lated, trespass, is not at issue, but, rather, the proprietor's racially discriminating practices).
Distinction is also made between solitary (Thoreau's refusal to pay his poll tax) and mass
(Gandhi and his Satyagraha movement) civil disobedience. For a full discussion of direct
and indirect civil disobedience, see HALL, supra note 12, at 31-35. Mass civil disobedience is
contrasted with solitary disobedience in Greenblatt, supra note 11.
30. Rawls, supra note 19. See also supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. It must
be remembered that compelling moral reasons generally rooted in "Higher Laws" such as a
religious teaching or other declarations of "irrefutable" natural rights provide the basis for
an act of civil disobedience. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
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C. Common Misconceptions and Assorted Claims Against Civil
Disobedience
The concept of civil disobedience has often been confused with
both protests which are legal and dramatic exercises of constitu-
tional rights" and protests not unlike riots involving violence and
failure to submit to the governing authority.32 Commentators have
severely criticized civil disobedience as being anarchistic,3 revolu-
tionary, 4 violent,3 5 coercive, 6 and as promoting general law-
lessness.37
31. The struggle of James Meredith to gain entrance into the University of Mississippi
in September of 1962 is illustrative of a dramatic, albeit legal, exercise of a constitutional
right. Meredith sought admission to the university on the basis of the ruling in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Meredith's entrance to the Registrar's office was
repeatedly blocked by Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett and Lieutenant Governor Paul
Johnson, as well as by several members of the Mississippi Highway Patrol. Despite Mere-
dith's refusal to obey Mississippi law barring the enrollment of Blacks in White Mississippi
universities, Meredith's acts cannot be viewed as acts of civil disobedience regardless of the
open, peaceable defiance since Meredith was not breaking a valid law. His attempt to ma-
triculate in the university was supported by the United States Supreme Court. See Mere-
dith v. Fair, 371 U.S. 828 (1962).
32. Examples of protests bearing no resemblance to civil disobedience include the race
riots in Detroit during 1967, the Watts riots in 1965 and the rioting in Miami during 1982.
True acts of civil disobedience impose pacifistic, self-imposed limits such as not resisting
arrest, refusing to respond to physical attack and often informing local authorities of a
planned civilly disobedient act. ZASHIN, supra note 9, at 110-14.
Mohandas Ghandi, whose acts of civil disobedience are well documented, wrote that "[wie
must therefore give its full and greater value to the adjective 'civil' that to 'disobedience'.
Disobedience without civility, discipline, discrimination, non-violence is certain destruc-
tion." M. GANDHI, NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE 173 (B. Jemarappa ed. 1961).
33. See Schlesinger, supra note 8. Schlesinger states:
If every citizen exercised what advocates of civil disobedience call his responsibility,
with or without a willingness to accept the penalty, and disregarded laws he believed
to be unjust, or other laws, to demonstrate that belief, the result would be violence,
chaos, or civil war-a total breakdown of the rule of law.
Id. at 953. See also FORTAS, supra note 18; Scoring, The Case Against Civil Disobedience, in
ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 96 (R. Goldwin ed. 1968); Rice, Civil Disobedience: A Formula for
Chaos, 17 ALA. LAw. 248 (1968).
34. See, e.g., Leibman, Civil Disobedience-A Threat to Our Law Society, 3 AM. CRIM.
L.Q. 21 (1964-65). Leibman wrote this article while serving as Chairman of the American
Bar Association Standing Committee on Education Against Communism. Id.
35. See, e.g., Waldman, Civil Rights- Yes: Civil Disobedience-No (A Reply to Dr. Mar-
tin Luther King), in BEDEAU, supra note 14, at 106. Waldman asserted that the purpose of
civil disobedience was to produce crisis-packed situations and tensions. He stated, "Such a
purpose is the very opposite of non-violence, for the atmosphere of crisis policy leads to
violence by provoking violence, and the provocation of violence is violence." Id. at 114.
36. See, e.g., Ernst, Free Speech and Civil Disobedience, 3 AM. CRiM. L.Q. 15 (1964-
65). Ernst states that "[tihe bar should not remain leaderless to prevent the further popu-
larization of sit-in, sit-down, going limp and all other techniques of violence to persuade by
show of force, rather than law." Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
37. Former Supreme Court Justice Charles Whittaker stated that:
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Civil disobedience cannot be conceptually identified with an-
archism, which holds that all law should be abolished. 8 As dis-
cussed above, civil disobedients respect the legal order. Accord-
ingly, a civil disobedient directs his efforts to reforming the law,
rather than abolishing it.39 As Professor DiSalvo has stated, "At
bottom, civil disobedients are lawmakers."' 0 As such, the claim
that an attitude of "lawlessness" necessarily ensues from the prac-
tice of civil disobedience is difficult to conceptually support,41 espe-
cially upon noting the particular issues and causes which have pro-
voked conscious dissenters to engage in true acts of civil
disobedience.2
[U]nder a banner of peaceable civil disobedience it ... is neither 'peaceable' nor
'civil' . . .. The .avowed purpose of such demonstrations is to force direct action
outside the law and hence is lawless, and of course, inherently disturbing to the peace
of others. The pattern of forcing demands by mass or mob actions, outside the law
and the courts, has proved-as certainly we should have expected, to be tailor made
for infiltration, use and take over by rebel-raisers and communists who are avowedly
bent on the breakdown of law, order and morality against our society, and hence, on
its destruction.
Whittaker, The Dangers of Mass Disobedience, 87 READERS DIGEST 122, 122-23 (1965).
38. Joan Bondurant, in discussing anarchism has stated that:
Anarchists further hold the undesirability of a state organization. They erase the
necessary superiority of voluntary association or mutualist agreement. They differ
from those political philosophers who hope that freedom will be won after the estab-
lishment of certain economic principles or programs, by insisting that freedom is a
fundamental condition upon which all else must follow. They urge freedom from
politics, rather than political freedom. Beyond these essential characteristics there is
considerable variation among the several anarchist schools of thought.
BONDURANT, CONQUEST OF VIOLENCE-A GANDHIAN PHILOSOPHY OF CONFLICT 173 (1965).
39. Harvard Professor John Rawls has commented that: "Civil Disobedience is not a
means of overturning a thoroughly unjust and corrupt system, for it presupposes a duty to
obey. It presupposes that the laws and policies protested deviate from the public conscience
and that appeal can be'made to that public sense of justice." RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
367 (1971).
40. DiSalvo, The Fracture of Good Order: An Argument For Allowing Lawyers to
Counsel the Civilly Disobedient, 17 GA. L. REV. 109, 149 (1982).
41. See supra notes 32-36.
42. See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text. By a "true" act of civil disobedience
is meant an act which satisfies every definitional element previously submitted. See supra
notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
Concurrent with the writing of this comment, much publicity on the regional and national
level was being given to the goals and tactics employed by followers and colleagues of a
Clairton, Pennsylvania Lutheran minister, D. Douglas Roth. Reverend Roth was allied with
the Network to Save the Mon/Ohio Valley (Network), a confrontational organization of la-
bor union members which believes that business interests, rather than government, possess
the power to create or destroy jobs and to assist the unemployed. Pittsburgh Press, Nov. 19,
1984, at 2, col. 6. Roth was also a member of the Denominational Ministry Strategy (DMS),
an affiliate of the Network, supported by approximately thirty ministers. Id.
Roth was dismissed from his pastoral duties by the Lutheran Synod, the overseers of his
church, after 96 of the 135 members petitioned the Synod to intervene and thereby disaffili-
722
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III. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
A. Gandhi and the Satyagraha Movement
The most striking example of true civil disobedience is found in
Mohandas Gandhi's struggle to persuade Great Britain to relin-
quish its colonial rule of India. Gandhi instituted a form of action
he termed "Satyagraha." Satyagraha, meaning "grasping or hold-
ing to the truth," included as one of its essential elements the de-
mand that civil resisters accept responsibility for their acts and
that respect be maintained for the views of the opposition.4" Gan-
ate the church from the Network and DMS. Roth remained pastor of the church after his
dismissal despite demands from the Synod to vacate the church. Roth was subsequently
arrested and jailed for contempt of court after refusing to obey an order to vacate the
church from Allegheny County Common Pleas Court Judge Emil Narick. New York Times,
Nov. 14, 1984, at 1, col. 2. Roth was released from jail after serving a ninety-day sentence.
The Synod was still unable to wrest control of the Clairton church from Roth's followers
after his jailing. The newly appointed pastor was turned away from the church for at least
five consecutive Sundays. Pittsburgh Press, Nov. 19, 1984, at 1, col. 2. Supporters of Rever-
end Roth vowed to use "defensive violence" if necessary to maintain control of the church.
Pittsburgh Press, Nov. 21, 1984, at 1, col. 4. The professional strategist behind the the Net-
work and DMS has indicated that the church "[would] have to be taken by force" and that
Roth's backers would "meet whatever level of evil comes at [them]" by carrying weapons
such as baseball bats. Id. The church was eventually siezed by the Allegheny County Sheriff
and the property restored to the Synod.
Reverend Roth and his followers engaging in confrontational tactics cannot be said to be
participating in true acts of civil disobedience as that concept has been developed in this
discussion. See supra notes 10-42 and accompanying text. Although their tactics hint at civil
disobedience in that they seek to educate the targeted corporate employers concerning the
plight of the unemployed and to persuade those corporations to act on the unemployed's
behalf, Roth's followers appear to rely almost exclusively on violent confrontation and the
fear of retaliation to advance their plea for a change in corporate attitudes. Such tactics run
afoul of true civil disobedience since violence is used or threatened. Threats of violent con-
frontation and coercion, as discussed earlier, cannot be substituted for non-violent moral
persuasion, a necessary element of true acts of civil disobedience. See supra notes 25-28 and
accompanying text.
Additionally, it does not appear that the followers of Reverend Roth are basing their defi-
ance upon any "higher" laws or natural rights. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying
text. The Network and DMS seem to be merely advancing their personal interests by oppos-
ing such corporate policies as overseas investment which purportedly cause domestic unem-
ployment. Pittsburgh Press, Nov. 21, 1984, at 1, col. 6. Regardless of the truth or sincerity of
their claims, the Network and DMS, in seeking a change in domestic corporate employment
practices, are not premising their actions on such "irrefutable" rights as to merit calling
their practices civil disobedience. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
43. The root meaning of Satyagraha is "holding on to truth". M. Gandhi, The Advent
of Satyagraha, in THE GANDHI READER 65 (J. Homer ed. 1956). Implicit from Gandhi's use
of Satyagraha as a means for a life encompassing search for truth is the notion that justice
and just relationships are to prevail. Id.
A concept within Satyagraha is Ahimsa, interpreted by Professor Zashin to imply "[tihe
complete avoidance of any evil in thought and in action. . . . Gandhi has said that the
individual who would live by Ahimsa 'should bear with the evil doer but not the evil'."
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dhi refused to allow those who did not abide by the principles of
Satyagraha to participate in his campaigns, requiring all partici-
pants to take a Satyagraha oath whereby they agreed to follow
truth faithfully and refrain from violence. During the campaign the
Satyagrahi were expected to continually examine personal motives
to ensure that they were not moving closer to the evils they were
opposing."'
Characteristic of civil disobedients, Gandhi instituted his cam-
paigns only when conventional methods of persuasion such as ne-
gotiation and formal redress by way of grievance procedures failed.
Not until additional intermediate steps proved futile did the Saty-
agrahi engage in civilly disobedient acts."5 The central theme
emerging from the Satyagraha campaign was that civil disobedi-
ence was not to be undertaken without extensive consideration of
the motives and equities involved and exhaustion of all alternative
means on the part of the participants.
B. Martin Luther King's Adoption of Gandhian Principles and
Techniques
Martin Luther King's emulation of Gandhian principles and
techniques during his leadership of civil rights campaigns in the
1950's and 1960's is well known." King ferverently believed non-
ZASHIN, supra note 9, at 150 (quoting GANDHI, NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE 41 (B. Kumarappa
ed. 1961)).
44. See generally G. DHAWAN, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MAHATMA GANDHI (1946).
See also GANDHI, THE STORY OF My EXPERIMENTS WITH TRUTH (M. Desai Trans. 1940).
45. Steps in a Satyagraha campaign included:
1. Negotiation and Arbitration. Every effort to resolve the conflict or redress the
grievance through established channels must be exhausted before the further steps
are undertaken.
2. Preparation of the Group for Direct Action. Subsequent to direct action, motives
are carefully examined, exercises in self-discipline initiated and the fullest discussion
launched within the group regarding issues at stake.
3. Agitation. This step includes an active propaganda campaign with mass meetings,
parades, slogan shouting.
4. Issuing of an Ultimatum. A final appeal. The wording and manner of presentation
of the ultimatum should offer the widest scope for agreement, allowing for face-saving
on the part of the opponent.
5. Economic Boycott and Forms of Strike. This includes picketing, demonstrations to
educate the public and sit-down strikes.
6. Non-Cooperation. Depending upon the nature of the issues at stake, such action as
non-payment of taxes, boycott of schools and other public institutions.
7. Civil Disobedience. Great care should be exercised in the selection of laws to be
contravened. Such laws should be either central to the grievance or symbolic.
BONDURANT, supra note 38, at 40.
46. As a theology student, King was exposed to the teachings of Gandhi and
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violence to be a moral imperative throughout his attempts to erad-
icate segregation practices and policies. After deciding in 1963 that
direct action was needed in Birmingham, Alabama, King, as had
Gandhi before him, prepared participants to react non-violently to
attacks. King noted that:
Not all who volunteered could pass our strict test for service as demon-
strators. Every volunteer was required to sign a commitment card that read:
"I hereby pledge myself-My person and body-to the non-violent
movement. Therefore, I will keep the following Ten Commandments:
2. Remember always that the non-violent movement in Birmingham seeks
justice and reconciliation, not victory.
4. Pray daily to be used by God in order that all men might be free.
6. Observe with both friend and foe the ordinary rules of courtesy.
8. Refrain from the violence of fist, tongue or heart.
10. Follow the directions of the movement and of the Captain on a
Demonstration.
I sign this pledge, having seriously considered what I will do and with the
determination and will to preserve.47
researched in depth the techniques and principles of Satyagraha. See M.L. KING, Pilgrimage
to Non-Violence, in STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM 71-86 (1958).
47. M.L. KING, WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 61-64 (1964). The other "commandments" in-
cluded the following:
1. Meditate daily on the teachings and life of Jesus.
3. Walk and talk in the answer of love, for God is love.
5. Sacrifice personal wishes in order that all men might be free.
7. Seek to perform regular service for others and for the world.
9. Strive to be in good spiritual and bodily health.
Id. at 61.
During the 1956 Montgomery campaign, the Montgomery Improvement Association pro-
vided these specific instructions to the riders of busses:
* Do not deliberately sit by a white person, unless there is no other seat.
* If cursed, do not curse back. If pushed, do not push back. If struck, do not strike
back. Evidence love and good will at all times.
* For the first few days try to get on the bus with a friend in whose non-violence you
have confidence. You can uphold one another by a glance or a prayer.
* If another person is being molested, do not arise to go to his defense, but pray for
the oppressor and use moral and spiritual force to carry on the struggle for justice.
KING, supra note 46, at 135.
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Implicit from the above pledge was King's aspiration toward a
disciplined campaign. King and Gandhi both perceived that to
counter claims that they were provoking lawlessness and revolution
it was imperative for their campaigns to be structured so that their
purposes and objectives were clearly understood so as not to create
fear that retaliation or violence would ensue upon their campaign
objectives not being met.4
King's disobedience to what he perceived as unjust racial policies
was premised on the belief that, by non-violently breaching unjust
laws or breaking just laws for symbolic"9 purposes, accompanied by
a willingness to accept the legal penalty, even the most hardened
opponent would be forced to rethink his position." Herein lies the
central theme of civil disobedience: namely, that the actor seeks to
persuade his opponent to change his position-and thus the laws
or policies viewed as unjust-without threats or violence or violent
retaliation on the part of the actor.51
IV. THE DISCIPLINARY DILEMMA
A. The Activist Lawyer
Civil disobedience is a technique used most often by groups
which have lacked means of compelling the governing authority to
recognize their claims through established political or legal
machineries.52 Claims put forth by such groups are usually ill-fa-
48. KING, supra note 47, at 60-61.
49. The distinction between symbolic and direct lawbreaking is analogous to the previ-
ously noted distinction between direct and indirect civil disobedience. See supra note 29.
50. In King's Letter From Birmingham City Jail he explained:
Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to create a tension in the mind so that
individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half truths to the unfettered
realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal, so must we see the need for non-
violent gadflies to create the kind of tension in society that will help men rise from
the dark depths of prejudice and racism to the majestic heights of understanding and
brotherhood.
M.L. KING, Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT, supra note 47, at
81.
51. For numerous other examples of acts of civil disobedience in America, see CIVIL
DISOBEDIENTS IN AMERICA (D. Weber ed. 1978). The editor has compiled essays concerning
the origins of civil disobedience and its occurrence in the mid-18th century, including
Thoreau's essay, Resistance to Civil Government: Disobedience to the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850; Susan B. Anthony's Statement to the Court, concerning women's suffrage; civil diso-
bedience during the civil rights campaigns; and conscientious resistance to World Wars I
and II, the Vietnam War and to nuclear proliferation. See id.
52. See, e.g., supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text for a discussion of the civil rights
campaigns in the United States during the 1950's and 1960's; supra notes 43-45 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the Satyagraha movement in India during the 1920's and
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vored not only with the populous in general but also with estab-
lished state bar associations. 53 Attorneys counseling clients whose
sentiments are out of step with contemporary points of view often
find their actions severely scrutinized by state bar associations and
disciplinary agencies.54
This state of affairs has been substantiated by a comprehensive
study conducted by Professor Jerome Carlin who investigated,
among other things, the correlation between the notoriety of a law-
yer's act and the disciplinary actions which ensued. 5  Among the
conclusions submitted by Carlin was that the
organized bar through the operation of its formal disciplinary measures
seems to be less concerned with scrutinizing the moral integrity of the pro-
fession than with forestalling public criticism and control .... Further evi-
dence that the organized bar is responding primarily to a concern for pre-
serving its public image is the considerable importance of the visibility of
the offense to the general community in the handling of disciplinary cases."
(emphasis supplied)
Other commentators have noted bar association and disciplinary
agency intolerance of attorneys who have supported minority
1930's. See also WEBER, supra note 51 for a discussion of the women's suffrage movement.
53. See Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1934). Justice
Harlan Stone characterized a large portion of the bar as being "[o]bsequious servants of
business... tainted... with the morals and manners of the marketplace in its most anti-
social manifestations." Id. at 7.
54. See Lyman, State Bar Discipline and the Activist Lawyer, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 235 (1973). Lyman noted that:
[O]nce misconduct is alleged, the activist attorney is prosecuted and judged by mem-
bers of the established Bar who are in little sense his peers. As the Clark Report
points out, disciplinary agencies 'will not proceed against prominent lawyers or law
firms and ... even when they do, no disciplinary action is taken, because the mem-
bers of the . . .agency simply will not make findings against those with whom they
are professionally and socially well acquainted'. An activist attorney, on the other
hand, is not a person with whom most agency members can readily empathize. His
courtroom efforts are likely to be directed at undermining the white, wealthy, and
politically conservative institutions of which Bar administrative agencies are repre-
sentative. There is, therefore, a real danger of bias and discrimination for lawyers and
judges of one philosophical view-in a sense the injured parties-have an unre-
strained hand in disciplining lawyers of another view. As Justice Black warned,
"[Tihe Rights of a Lawyer ... to practice cannot be left to the mercies of his pro-
spective or present competitors."
Id. at 239 (citing Law Students Civil Rights Research Counsel, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S.
154, 174 (Black, J., dissenting)). The reference to the Clark Report is from the ABA Special
Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1 (1970).
55. CARLIN, LAWYERS ETHics-A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR (1966). Carlin, a
lawyer and sociologist, conducted the survey for Columbia University.
56. Id. at 159-60.
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causes." A dramatic example may be found in the case of James
Gilliland, a North Carolina attorney. Gilliland was a decorated
World War II veteran who later received his law degree from Wake
Forest in 1948. He held numerous civic posts, serving as Com-
mander of the local American Legion, as an officer in the Veterans
of Foreign Wars and as secretary of the Lions Club. In 1954 he was
asked to explain the significance of the Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion5" decision to his local Lions Club. Gilliland explained how he
favored the policies underlying the decision and how he hoped it
would be obeyed. Concurrent with this declaration, he represented
eleven alleged communists before a regional session of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities. Lastly, he suggested that
the committee leave his clients alone and turn its attention to
school officials who evaded the 1954 Supreme Court desegregation
decision. 9
Gilliland was subsequently expelled from the Lions Club and
country clubs, lost his positions with other organizations and faced
disbarment proceedings. The State Bar Counsel later disbarred
Gilliland for "irregularities" in two divorce suits. He was subse-
quently reinstated after an appeal to the North Carolina Supreme
Court.60 Gilliland's experiences with the State Disciplinary Counsel
arising out of his affiliations with unpopular causes is by no means
an isolated occurrence."1
57. See Pollitt, Counsel for the Unpopular Cause: the "Hazard of Being Undone", 43
N.C.L. REV. 9 (1964). The author recounts numerous examples of lawyers receiving harsh
reprimands from state disciplinary boards after counseling either unpopular clients or cli-
ents with unpopular causes. See also Lyman, supra note 54.
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
59. Pollitt, supra note 57, at 10.
60. In re Gilliland, 248 N.C. 517, 103 S.E.2d 807 (1958).
61. See Pollitt, supra note 57, where the author, through use of numerous examples of
instances where state disciplinary organizations have invoked disciplinary actions against an
attorney subsequent to his representing or counseling "unpopular" clients, purports to
demonstrate such agencies' conservatism. The author states:
When in 1950 President Truman courageously vetoed the Internal Security Act as
a violation of the Bill of Rights, the American Bar Association immediately de-
manded an overriding of the veto. The pattern has continued. On issue after issue
requiring a delicate balance of individual rights and national security, the brief and
prestige of the American Bar Association is inevitably found allied with the state
against the individual.
Id. at 23.
Other examples of state bar biases are exemplified by cases such as In the Matter of
Schlesinger, Esq., 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961) (disciplinary committee comprised solely
of members of the Allegheny County, Pennsylvania bar instituted disbarment proceedings
against member based solely on allegation of Communist party membership; proceedings
carried forth notwithstanding quashing of criminal indictment).
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B. The Conceptual Tension Between the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Civil Disobedience
The Code of Professional Responsibility presently has a three-
tier structure consisting of Canons, Ethical Considerations and
Disciplinary Rules. The Canons are "statements of axiomatic
norms, expressing in general terms the standards of professional
conduct expected of lawyers."6 The Ethical Considerations are
"aspirational and represent the objectives toward which every
member should strive."6 3 Disciplinary Rules are "proscriptive and
the minimal level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall with-
out being subject to disciplinary action."
' e"
See also Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 228 (1966). In Hallinan, the State Bar of California refused to admit the petitioner to
the state bar even though he graduated from an accredited law school and passed the bar
examination. A bar examiner contended that Hallinan lacked "good moral character." The
bar examiner cited Hallinan's participation in peaceful civil disobedience including sit-ins
and demonstrations for purposes of persuading employers to hire Negroes, six fist fights
(which the court later classified as "youthful indiscretions"), and a fist fight transpiring
when Hallinan was attacked by his girlfriend's former suitor. The Supreme Court of Califor-
nia subsequently ordered the bar examiners to admit Hallinan for admission to practice law
in California. Id.
See also Evans, On the Duty of Advocating Civil Disobedience, 18 ALBERTA L. REV. 520
(1980), wherein the author gives the account of an Edmonton attorney, Harry Midgley, who
in May of 1979 was charged with conduct unbecoming a barrister and solicitor by the Law
Society of Alberta. Midgley was charged with attempting to subvert the law by counseling or
assisting in activities which were in defiance of the proposed City of Edmonton curfew by-
law. Midgley was President of the Alberta Chapter of the Civil Liberties Association, a vol-
unteer organization dedicated to the advancement of human rights and civil liberties in
Alberta. Id. at 521. Midgley was of the opinion that a proposed by-law to the Edmonton
Ordinance Code banning juveniles from the streets between 10:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M. would
be in violation of the Alberta Bill of Rights. Upon publication of similar statements, the
Alberta Chamber of Commerce sent a letter to the Law Society of Alberta citing Midgley's
remarks that "[i]f every person and child defied [the proposed curfew], and pleaded not
guilty that if it came to the courts, the absurdity and enormity of it would become patently
obvious in a very short time." Id. at 520. The Chamber of Commerce concluded that "[flor a
person to publicly advise any group to defy any particular law that it does not like ...is
quite unacceptable and irresponsible." Id. at 521. The receipt of this letter by the Law Soci-
ety resulted in disciplinary action against Midgley. The Chairman of the Disciplinary Com-
mittee was quoted as saying, "Any time a lawyer oversteps his bounds and advocates civil
disobedience, I consider that to be serious enough to investigate." Id.
See also CARLIN, supra note 55.
62. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIIrIY, Preamble, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon
1984).
63. Id.
64. Id. See Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of Professional Responsibility?, 57
N.C.L. REV. 497 (1978-79). The author provides a detailed discussion concerning the struc-
ture of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Sutton served as Reporter for the ABA
Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standard which promulgated the present code.
See also Sutton, The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility: An Introduction, 48 TEx. L.
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Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(7) provides that "[in his representa-
tion of a client, a lawyer shall not counsel or assist his client in
conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent." 5 As
evidenced by the ethical considerations preceding the rule, the ap-
parent purpose behind this disciplinary measure is to prevent col-
lusion on the part of the attorney and client to perpetrate criminal
or fraudulent acts.6 6 However, the language of the rule allows room
for action by disciplinary boards against attorneys who encourage
or advise a client to engage in true acts of civil disobedience. Re-
gardless of whether active prosecution is being carried out by disci-
plinary boards, the chilling effect on attorneys disposed to counsel
clients planning or engaging in acts of civil disobedience is ines-
capable, as is the fear of selective enforcement.17 Further, when
considering the generally conservative nature of bar associations
and disciplinary boards, and the usually unpopular causes ad-
vanced by clients who would engage in civil disobedience, the at-
torney who counsels such clients runs a substantial risk of discipli-
nary sanctions.68
V. PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-102(A)(7)
Cognizant of the purpose underlying civil disobedience explored
in this comment,69 it is submitted that DR 7-102(A)(7) be modified
to specifically exclude from its scope attorneys who encourage or
counsel a client to engage in true acts of civil disobedience.70 The
REV. 255 (1970); Sutton, Re-Evaluation of the Canons of Professional Ethics: A Revisor's
Viewpoint, 32 TENN. L. REv. 132 (1965-66).
65. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon 1984). All fifty states have either adopted DR 7-102(A)(7) or a similar statute. See
M. PROCTOR & R. ALEXANDER-SMITH, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE (1980).
66. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1, 7-10, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon 1984).
See, e.g., Office of the Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 463 Pa. 472, 345 A.2d 616 (1975)
(attorney could still be charged with violating DR 7-102(A)(7) regardless of the fact that he
was acquitted of criminal charges in his role of "fixing" a narcotics case for his client), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 926 (1976); Relin v. New York State Bar Ass'n, 53 A.D.2d 223, 385
N.Y.S.2d 745 (1976) (attorney suspended from practice for, among other things, advising his
client to operate a tavern knowing that it was in violation of the law).
67. See, e.g., the first amendment "chill cases": Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S.
1 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); LaMont v. Postmaster Gen-
eral, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Daggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). The Supreme Court, in the
cited cases, has acknowledged that a "chilling effect" exists based on the proscription of
behavior alone even without active enforcemnent.
68. See DR 7-102(A)(7), supra note 62.
69. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
70. In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957), Justice Black stated:
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correlative provisions of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct,71 presently under consideration by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, should be likewise amended if adopted. A revision to
this effect is desirable in that it would advance two meritorious
objectives. The first would be the obvious lifting of the chilling ef-
fect implicit in the current Disciplinary Rule. The related fear of
selective enforcement of the rule by a state disciplinary agency not
found to be completely unbiased in its enforcement of proscriptive
rules would also be mitigated. Secondly, the proposed modification
would allow an attorney greater freedom to assess the moral prior-
ity of his client's proposed actions.
A. Construction of the Amended Rule
It would not be necessary to eliminate from the Code Discipli-
nary Rule 7-102(A)(2) in its entirety in order to achieve the desired
modification. The rule in its present form serves the important
policy objective of deterring attorneys from engaging in collusive
efforts with clients for the purposes of defrauding others or com-
mitting other criminal acts.72 Rather, all that would be required is
an additional clause to the present rule.
Proposed DR 7-102(A)(2) could read:
In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not . . . counsel or assist his
client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent except
that a lawyer may counsel his client prior to acts of conscientious civil
disobedience.
To avoid confusion as to what acts constitute "conscientious civil
disobedience," additional ethical considerations could be formu-
lated which amplify the definition of "true" civil disobedience dis-
cussed previously.
73
A bar composed of lawyers of good character is a worthy objective but it is unnec-
essary to sacrifice vital freedoms in order to obtain that goal. It is also important both
to society and the bar itself that lawyers be unintimidated-free to think, speak, and
act as members of an Independent Bar.
Id. at 273 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
71. See supra note 4.
72. See supra text accompanying note 66.
73. See supra note 42. One commentator has called for a similar amendment of DR 7-
102(A)(7):
A lawyer shall not. . . counsel or assists his client in conduct that the lawyer knows
to be illegal, except that a lawyer may counsel his client in acts of civil disobedience.
An act of civil disobedience, for the purpose of this Rule, is an act of deliberate and
open violation of the law with the intent, within the framework of the prevailing form
of government, to protest a wrong or to accomplish some betterment in society.
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B. Justification for Amending DR 7-102(A)(7)
The disciplinary dilemma confronting the attorney would be al-
leviated were this modification to be effected. The attorney mor-
ally compelled to counsel a client disposed to commit civil disobe-
dience would have his fears of discipline minimized provided he
and his client were acting within the parameters established by the
ethical considerations underlying the amended disciplinary rule.
In addition, and of greater importance, the proposed disciplinary
rule would grant an attorney the discretion to abide by his con-
science or moral beliefs when particular laws impinge on such be-
liefs to an intolerable degree. Justification for such discretion can
be found in the United States Supreme Court's longstanding rec-
ognition that "[i]n the forum of conscience, there is a moral power
higher than the state."' Acknowledging that law and morality can
diverge, 5 the Court has often taken the position that conflicts be-
DiSalvo, supra note 40, at 141-42.
DiSalvo, in addition to arguing for the above change in DR 7-102(A)(7), also provides an
analytic framework which an attorney could utilize when counseling a client desiring to en-
gage in civil disobedience.
DiSalvo discusses the case In re Margolis, 269 Pa. 206, 112 A. 478 (1921), as one of an
attorney being disbarred for advocating civil disobedience. DiSalvo, supra note 41, at 133-
34. However, the definition and analysis of civil disobedience as developed in the present
discussion would not permit Margolis' acts to be viewed as true civil disobedience. See
supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text. Margolis, an attorney, allied himself with several
Bolshevik organizations including the "Industrial Workers of the World." 269 Pa. at 208,
112 A. at 479. He also testified that he was an anarchist. Id. at 210, 112 A. at 479. Although
he advocated non-compliance with the Selective Service Act of 1917 on the basis of his
general objection to war, Margolis essentially sought the overthrow of the prevailing politi-
cal and legal order. Id. at 210, 112 A. at 479. He publicly advised his listeners to "prepare to
equip yourselves to o" the industries and mines" of the state. Id. at 210, 112 A. at 480.
The trial court found that he advocated the use of force if necessary to carry out these
objectives. Id.
As an anarchist, rather than a conscientious civil disobedient, Margolis appears to have
been a subscriber to a concept found previously herein to be incongruous with the purposes
underlying civil disobedience. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. Moreover,
Margolis' advocacy of coercive force constitutes behavior likewise found to be in the strong-
est sense incompatible with the idea of civil disobedience as previously discussed. See supra
notes 25, 46-51 and accompanying text.
Despite the insights DiSalvo has provided concerning changes in the legal and social order
through open defiance, his article may be said to be wanting of a more detailed considera-
tion of the moral motivations implicit in acts of conscientious civil disobedience and of the
necessary abstention from coercive or violent tactics by civil disobedients. The Margolis
discussion points up this deficiency. See DiSalvo, supra note 40, at 133-34.
74. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 68 (1946) (citizenship granted to native of
Canada even though refusing for religious reasons to agree in oath that he would take up
arms to defend the United States).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (exempting three conscien-
tious objectors not members of an established religious sect from Selective Service Act).
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tween law and morality should be resolved in favor of the latter.76
In addition, then, to the support of political philosophers,77 the Su-
preme Court itself has recognized the legitimacy of the underlying
premise of true civil disobedience-that conscientious appeals to
"Higher Law" are valid.78
It must be remembered that the intention behind acts of civil
disobedience is to reform unjust laws. 79 The actor seeks to educate
the majority as to the injustice perpetrated by the current law so
as to persuade the majority to engage the legal process to reform
the statute or policy without the threat of violence on the part of
the actors. 80 Accordingly, the proposed modification of DR 7-.
102(A)(7) permitting lawyers to counsel civil disobedients prior to
the illegal act mitigates the fear posited by John F. Kennedy when
he stated that "those who make peaceful revolution impossible will
make violent revolution inevitable."8'
Thomas E. Weiers, Jr.
76. See, e.g., id. at 170 (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931)
(Hughes, C.J., dissenting)).
77. See RAWLS, supra note 39, where the author states:
If justified civil disobedience seems to threaten civil concord, the responsibility falls
not upon those who protest but upon those whose abuse of authority and power jus-
tify such opposition. To employ the coercive apparatus of the state in order to main-
tain manifestly unjust institutions is itself a form of illegitimate force that men in
due course have a right to resist.
Id. at 391.
See also Freeman, supra note 21; Keeton, supra note 19; Cohen, Essence and Ethics of
Civil Disobedience, 198 NATION 257-62 (1964).
78. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1964); Girouard v. United States, 328
U.S. 61 (1946). See also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), where in discussing
Congress' recognition of conscientious objectors to war, the Court noted Congress' "respect
for the general proposition that fundamental principles of conscience and religious duty may
sometimes override the demands of the secular state." Id. at 445. See also Parisi v. David-
son, 405 U.S. 34 (1972), in which the Court acknowledged the "historic respect in this Na-
tion for valid conscientious objection. ... Id. at 45.
79. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
80. See Zashin, supra note 9, at 117-18. See also supra notes 25-26 and accompanying
text.
81. Kennedy, Address on the First Anniversary of the Alliance For Progress, PUBLIC
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 220, 223 (1962).
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